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The Development of Elementary and 
Secondary Education Policy in the 
Minnesota Legislature 
JOYCE KRUPEY* and GENE MAMMENGA ** 
ABSTRACT-This discussion of the political climate in which elementary and secondary education is funded in 
Minnesota begins with the Minnesota Miracle of 1971. In each successive legislative session some adjustments 
have been made in this formula. In this paper we describe the various lobbying groups that try to affect educa-
tion legislation. We also discuss the role played by the governor, key legislators, legislative and Department of 
Education staff, the State Board of Education, and the commissioner of education in educational policy forma-
tion. In conclusion, we summarize major formula changes since 1971 and review the many education-related 
issues before the legislature during the 1985 session. We conclude that major public education decisions are 
ultimately made by a few key legislators and legislative staff, although input is provided by many groups. 
Introduction 
Minnesota has historically been generous in support of its 
public school system. While not a rich state, it has maintained 
a place among the top ten states in the United States in terms 
of per pupil funding. For the 1982 school year Minnesota 
ranked ninth in terms of spending per pupil (1). 
At a time when tax reductions are a priority issue with both 
political parties, Minnesotans remain willing to forego a por-
tion of a tax cut if the money goes to improving public 
schools. Seventy-one percent of those polled in February 
1985 said they were willing to make that kind of commitment 
to public education (2). Recent national polls asking the same 
question show that less than 50% of those polled would be 
willing to make a similar commitment (3). The 71% figure re-
flects an increase of 10 points over a similar poll commis-
sioned five years ago. 
This is the framework in which Minnesota's educational 
policy is developed. Politicians of both parties are quick to 
praise Minnesota's public education system. In the 1978 gu-
bernatorial election, then Governor Rudy Perpich recalled 
how public education was a "passport out of poverty" for him 
and his brothers, while challenger Congressman Al Quie re-
peatedly referred to his congressional expertise in education 
gained as ranking minority member of the House Labor and 
Education Committee. Campaigning on a billion dollar tax 
cut, Independent Republicans in 1984 gained control of the 
state House of Representatives for the first time in 13 years. 
Nevertheless, they established education funding as one of 
their top four legislative priorities. These politicians reflect 
· · the views of their constituents; Minnesotans believe in public 
education and, when made aware of the need, are willing to 
pay the price necessary to sustain quality. 
Education, therefore, seldom emerges as a controversial 
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political issue. Minnesota politicians do not choose to run 
against public schools. In spite of this, the funding of public 
education became, almost inadvertently, a major item in the 
1970 Anderson-Head campaign for governor. At a Citizens' 
League luncheon in October of that year, Wendell Anderson 
proposed what has become known as the Minnesota Miracle, 
a major funding change that involved limiting local school tax 
levies and shifting the tax burden for education to state in-
come and sales taxes. Prior to this 1971 legislation, the prop-
erty tax was the major funding source for education in 
Minnesota. Rapidly escalating property taxes and wide dispar-
ities among school districts in both tax rates and available fi-
nancial resources per pupil were the primary conditions that 
led to the enactment of the Minnesota Miracle. The immediate 
objective was to reduce property taxes while allotting more 
education monies to property-poor school districts. Dr. Tim 
Mazzoni authored an excellent study of how this major 
change in educational policy was accomplished ( 4). 
The new funding formula underlined Minnesota's willing-
ness to be in the forefront of educational policy-making. For 
years afterward, Minnesota legislators and staff were centers 
of attention at national meetings where they were repeatedly 
asked how the change had been accomplished. The Minne-
sota formula was one of the first of its type and remains gener-
ally admired by school finance scholars. In the 14 years since 
this formula was adopted, it has undergone many revisions to 
deal with the evolving problems of school districts, but the ba-
sic character of the formula remains unchanged. 
Few people today remember the intense political fervor of 
1971. State newspapers headlined talk of property tax revolts. 
However, a Minnesota Proposi'tion 13 movement was short-
circuited by the tax shift included in the new school aid for-
mula. This legislation was vital to all Minnesotans interested 
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in educational policy, for it drastically limited the access of lo-
cal districts to the property tax. It made new funds available to 
traditionally low-spending districts. It also focused the atten-
tion of many more state legislators on the education aid for-
mula since the formula now so directly affected the state 
budget. Finally, it led key legislators not on the education 
committees to be interested in the education aids bill, clearly 
the biggest money bill of every funding session. 
Struggles have ensued on the part of the education interest 
groups to adjust the formula to their concept of tax and fund-
ing equity every legislative session. A number of groups and 
individuals labor full time attempting to influence Minn-
esota educational policy. These groups are discussed here in 
an arbitrary order unrelated to their influence on policy 
development. 
Lobbying Groups 
The Minnesota School Boards Association (MSBA) includes 
in its membership all of the 435 state school boards. In addi-
tion to providing technical information regarding state laws 
and Department of Education rules and regulations to its 
members , MSBA also maintains an active lobbying team in St. 
Paul. There it vigorously defends the local management rights 
of school districts. The MSBAand the teachers' organizations, 
the Minnesota Education Association (MEA) and the Minne-
sota Federation of Teachers (MFT), often take opposing sides 
on issues related to collective bargaining and "teacher rights" 
such as tenure protection and seniority dismissal. 
Some dissension has developed in MSBA ranks over educa-
tion finance. Metropolitan school boards, especially those of 
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and the first ring of suburbs, have felt 
that greater organizational priority should be given to in-
creased state funding. In 1967 the Minneapolis school district 
assigned one of its administrators to full-time legislative duty. 
His skill and aggressiveness encouraged others to consider 
similar actions. Immediately prior to the 1973 legislative ses-
sion, St. Paul hired a former legislator as its first full-time lob-
byist. The following year a group of inner-ring, Twin Cities 
suburban school districts formed their own lobbying organi-
zation called the Association of Metropolitan School Districts 
(AMSD). The AMSD districts were experiencing severe en-
rollment declines coupled with a growing concentration of 
highly trained, veteran teachers on their staffs. These staffing 
and enrollment patterns were, and still are, similar to those in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul schools. 
With urban and AMSD districts represented at the legisla-
ture, other districts began to realize they also had common in-
terests that should be communicated to legislators. In 1979 
many outer-ring suburbs and other outlying districts formed 
the Association for Stable and Growing School Districts 
(ASGSD). Their initial goal was to equalize access for their 
districts to the increased revenue that had become available 
to urban and AMSD districts. Like the others, they were re-
markably successful in their efforts. In recent years some out-
lying districts have joined AMSD, making the differences 
between the interests of these two associations less clear. It is 
interesting to speculate on the dangers of losing focus as an 
organization grows larger. It is easier to approach the legisla-
ture successfully when objectives are clear and agreed upon 
by all members. 
Together with the three urban districts, these associations 
are in the forefront of efforts to increase educational funding. 
While they have remained within the MSBA and continue to 
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participate in its delegate assemblies, the AMSD, ASGSD, and 
the St. Paul , Minneapolis, and Duluth school districts have 
each developed separate legislative goals and, through their 
own lobbyists, petitioned the legislature urging support of 
these goals. These efforts, the authors believe, have been 
effective. 
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth legislators are kept well 
informed by their school district lobbyists. Data regarding the 
districts are supplied regularly to each legislator who thereby 
finds it much easier to be knowledgeable on educational mat-
ters than the rural legislator whose legislative district includes 
a number of school districts. The staffs of AMSD and ASGSD 
perform similar functions. For instance, in making its case for 
increased funds , AMSD, with the cooperation of school dis-
trict business officers, compiles extensive fiscal data includ-
ing five-year financial projections for each of their districts. 
Legislators appreciate this information and, in turn, do what 
they can to aid the school districts in their efforts. AMSD has 
also been adept at forming a supportive coalition of school 
board members, school administrators, teachers, and parents 
who have worked together to build a strongly united educa-
tion community. As a consequence, suburban legislators of 
both parties regularly advocate increased educational fund-
ing from both state and local tax sources. 
The creation of these independent lobbying forces has had 
an influence on the nature of the MSBA lobbying effort. A 
close relationship has traditionally existed between the small 
outstate district and the MSBA office. The smaller district has 
to rely on MSBAfor more technical and legal information than 
does a larger district, whose size allows for buying indepen-
dent legal advice and hiring administrative personnel with 
the expertise necessary to deal with the technical administra-
tive details. 
Outstate districts tend to be more fearful of changes in the 
Public Employee Labor Relations Act (PELRA) that broaden 
collective bargaining rights. They also share a heightened 
concern over legislation supporting school consolidation. 
Any efforts in these directions serve as organizational rallying 
points for the MSBA. Metropolitan and suburban districts are 
much less concerned with such legislation. As a result, some 
observers identify MSBA as the voice of Minnesota's smaller 
school districts. 
School superintendents have several ways of expressing 
their policy opinions. Because they deal directly with the De-
partment of Education, their views are immediately available 
to the department. They also report directly to local boards of 
education, and their ideas are often incorporated into MSBA 
legislative programs. Finally, they have their own organiza-
tion , the Minnesota Association of School Administrators 
(MASA). Superintendents and administrators other than prin-
cipals and assistant principals belong to MASA. MASA con-
cerns itself with certification standards, due process 
dismissal, seniority rights, and laws dealing with curriculum 
and school discipline. 
Elementary and secondary school principals have separate 
organizations. The Minnesota Elementary School Principals 
Association (MESPA) and the Minnesota Association of Sec-
ondary School Principals (MASSP) include principals and as-
sistant principals in their membership. The principals' 
organizations are, along with MASA, somewhat hampered in 
their lobbying activities because they have a limited profes-
sional staff and a large state to cover. Full-time lobbying as 
practiced by MEA, MFT, MSBA, and the metropolitan lobbying 
groups is impossible for the superintendents' and principals' 
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organizations. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the positions 
held by the school administrators guarantees the attention of 
the legislature. Given a reasonable effort to convey their 
views to legislative policy-makers, the administrators have an 
impact well beyond what their numbers would seem to war-
rant. They are key figures in the education process, and legis-
lators want to hear from these front-line observers. 
The Minnesota Association of School Business Officials 
does not maintain a regular lobbying presence at the capitol. 
The organization does, however, provide information, ad-
vice, and testimony on school district financial matters at ap-
propriate points in the legislative process. Legislators and staff 
call upon this organization and its individual members to re-
view suggestions for major changes in fiscal policy and to 
provide information on how these changes will affect the fis-
cal health and management of school districts. The organiza-
tion does not regularly support a legislative program or 
agenda but does provide information on specific fiscal pro-
posals as the occasion arises. In this way, the organization 
provides valuable service and has an impact on the policy 
process. 
The Minnesota teacher groups, the Minnesota Education 
Association (MEA) and the Minnesota Federation of Teachers 
(MFT), have the numbers the administrators lack, and both 
unions consciously and deliberately organize their members 
on a statewide basis to actively engage in political activity 
aimed at influencing every aspect of public education policy. 
Although the MEA and MFT are in an ongoing jurisdictional 
battle, the changes each organization seeks in educational 
policy differ more in emphasis and style than substance. 
These differences are accented when bargaining elections pit 
the teacher organizations against each other. 
Teacher political activity has become a major ingredient in 
educational policy-making. Most teachers have overcome a 
prior reluctance to participate in partisan politics. In practice, 
they make excellent campaign workers and often play key 
roles in individual legislative races. During each legislative 
session, many legislators maintain close contact with local 
teacher representatives. When an issue such as the right to 
strike arouses teacher interest, they direct thousands of calls 
and letters to the legislature and are difficult to ignore. 
Both teacher groups have full-time lobbyists and spend 
considerable time and money reporting daily legislative hap-
penings to their membership. The teacher organizations join 
lobbyists from the first-class cities and the AMSD and ASGSD 
as the most consistent and outspoken advocates of increased 
school funding. 
The Parent Teacher Student Association (PTSA) has a 
largely unrealized potential as a lobbying group. Legislators 
tend to seek and respond to entreaties from those who are in-
terested in education but who are not part of the education 
establishment. Parents have the potential to influence educa-
tional policy in a way different from the people involved in 
school work: teachers, administrators, and board members. It 
takes only a few parent letters to make a substantial impres-
sion on legislators. As noted earlier, some of the success of the 
suburban school districts can be traced to their ability to in-
clude parents in their political coalition. 
The special education lobby composed almost exclusively 
of parents of children with special needs is a prime example 
of what a sufficiently motivated parental group can accom-
plish. During roughly the last 10 to 15 years, the parents of 
special needs children have, through persistent lobbying ef-
forts, made public education services available to thousands 
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of children previously unserved. The commitment of these 
lay people to this cause brought about dramatic funding in-
creases, making it possible to hire needed professional staff. 
In fact, as overall declining enrollments have caused a reduc-
tion in the number of classroom teachers, the addition of spe-
cial education personnel has kept the total teaching cadre at 
near static levels. 
The special education parent lobbying effort is only one ex-
ample of the ability of the public to affect educational policy. 
In several other areas educators have had able allies in their 
struggle to increase funding and expand programs. Voca-
tional education, both secondary and postsecondary, has 
been the beneficiary of the efforts of groups in the business 
and labor communities interested in the creation and mainte-
nance of a strong vocational program. The comparatively 
rapid growth of vocational education in Minnesota owes a 
great deal to this effective coalition. 
Still another group that has begun to establish itself as a 
lobby are the directors, advisers, and enrollees in community 
education programs. Initiated in the 1960s when it was known 
as the "lighted school house," this program has involved 
groups previously unassociated with the schools. Because of 
this program, community education directors seeking in-
creased funding for their programs can now fill committee 
hearing rooms with a wide range of enthusiatic citizens. 
Essentially all of the educational interest groups are mem-
bers of the BELL organization (Better Education Legislative 
Liaison). This group gathers and shares information and 
meets periodically during the session to informally discuss 
legislation. The governor and legislative leaders meet on a 
fairly regular basis with BELL, allowing decision makers to 
communicate instantaneously with almost all education inter-
est groups. Such meetings are useful to both sides as trial 
ideas are discussed. 
BELL also has held short conferences on subjects of general 
interest to the education community such as special educa-
tion aids, early childhood education, and staff maturity in-
dexes. An out-of-state expert once stated in amazement that 
never before in any state had he seen such dissimilar groups 
conferring together, seeking a common goal. Although the 
members of BELL can often agree on general approaches to 
increased education funding, the organization recognizes 
that there are different ways to achieve their goals. The mem-
bers of BELL have not, therefore, ever united in support of or 
in opposition to any specific funding issue. The authors be-
lieve that BELL's usefulness and continued existence depends 
on its staying within this information gathering and sharing 
format and not in becoming a super lobby group. 
Others Who Influence Policy 
The Department of Education has a primary duty of imple-
menting legislative educational policy. The department is 
also charged by the legislature with the gathering of a great 
deal of information, and it serves, therefore, as the chief 
repository of educational data. In addition, the legislature of-
ten establishes policy in a general way, leaving the depart-
ment responsible for drawing up rules and regulations 
needed to implement legislatic?n. These rules and regulations 
are adopted officially by the State Board of Education after a 
series of public hearings (presided over by an attorney em-
ployed as a State Hearing Officer). These rules and regula-
tions have the force of law. 
In the past there was little legislative oversight of depart-
mental rule making. But during the last five to ten years, legis-
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lators, through their staff, have more diligently seen that 
interpretation of the law through departmental rules coin-
cides with the legislature's original intent. Consequently, the 
policy-making powers of the legislature have been enhanced 
in this arena. 
During each legislative session the education committees 
process legislation known as Departmental Bills. The major-
ity of these bills are housekeeping in nature; that is, they do 
not involve policy-making. They seek instead to alter current 
statutes so as to make their administration more manageable. 
Departmental staff monitor committee meetings in order to 
be prepared to testify whenever legislators seek their exper-
tise on policy matters, data, or housekeeping bills. ·· 
The role of the Department of Education during the legisla-
tive session includes presenting and defending the gover-
nor's education budget, processing departmental bills, and 
providing information to committees as needed. The depart-
ment's responsibility for the governor's budget and educa-
tion initiatives was significantly changed in the 1983 session 
when the legislature provided for the direct appointment of 
the commissioner of education by the governor. Before that 
time the commissioner had been appointed by the State 
Board of Education with the approval of the governor. 
The commissioner now has the clear responsibility for 
shepherding the governor's initiatives through the legislative 
process. Meanwhile, the State Board of Education has been 
authorized to employ its own staff person to assist in accom-
plishing the board's objectives. The department's and com-
missioner's legislative responsibilities are carried out by the 
legislative liaison, a position that has been held by a deputy 
commissioner, an assistant commissioner, and department 
civil service staff personnel. Although the liaison is not la-
beled a lobbyist, the duties are similar and include communi-
cating with and educating legislators regarding the 
governor's and department's education program and funding 
priorities. The departmental civil service staff also are respon-
sible to the State Board of Education. This divided responsi-
bility has the potential to produce significant problems if the 
State Board of Education is in disagreement with the gover-
nor on any major issue. 
The Department of Education's legislative liaison assumes 
the responsibility for the department's presence at the legisla-
ture. This includes assuring that appropriate department staff 
are available to testify at committee meetings when informa-
tion or expertise is needed, monitoring committee hearings, 
managing departmental housekeeping bills, as well as man-
aging the governor's budget initiatives. 
In the process of fashioning the budget request, the gover-
nor may rely on the department to provide support data for 
any policy initiative being developed. However, history has 
shown that Minnesota's chief executives may choose to use 
the State Planning Office, their own staff, and increasingly, the 
Department of Finance as alternatives to Department of Edu-
cation personnel in developing policy. 
It seems safe to say that during the 1970s and early 1980s the 
department has done less to initiate change than to serve as an 
enforcement agency and information gatherer. That role 
could be altered should the governor or key legislators de-
cide to use the department differently. For example, during 
the Quie administration the department was asked to develop 
a formula variation for basic education funding, which was 
the basis of the Quie education budget. Although the formula 
was not adopted, it did serve as a model for later changes ini-
tiated by the legislature. 
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Ruth Randall, more than any other commissioner of educa-
tion in recent memory, has led the department in creating ma-
jor initiatives for change in education policy. Although it is too 
early to determine what the result of these initiatives will be, 
the attempt to exert leadership from the department level is 
significant. Since legislative leaders had developed pilot 
legislation similar to some of the department's initiatives, it 
may be difficult in the long run to clearly ascribe credit for 
changes in these areas. 
The State Board of Education is composed of nine mem-
bers appointed by the governor. Although appointments to 
the Board of Education are political in the sense that IR and 
DFL governors name candidates from their political parties, 
the appointments have little partisan significance. Boards of 
Education have not held distinct philosophical positions re-
lated to their political make-up. 
The board, through the department itself and in coopera-
tion with the commissioner, oversees the operation of the De-
partment of Education. Except for some recent notoriety 
associated with developing state desegregation guidelines, 
the state board does not receive much publicity. Its affirma-
tions of the legislative program brought to it by department 
personnel typically create little controversy because, as indi-
cated above, those issues are usually technical and proce-
dural. Few Minnesotans can name any members of the board, 
and a member's role in policy formation is seldom significant. 
The governor can dedde to play an important role in edu-
cational policy-making. A press conference called by the gov-
ernor commands an audience. Senators and congressmen 
live and act in distant Washington, D.C. , and while there are 
201 state legislators, there is only one governor. The gover-
nor, therefore, can focus state attention on an educational is-
sue more easily and more effectively than any other public 
official. Wendell Anderson, for instance, made the education 
aid formula a statewide issue. AI Quie did the same with K-3 
class size, and Rudy Perpich has made transfer across district 
lines a major issue. Governors may not always win but they 
can direct the discussion. 
The governor's primary governmental responsibility and 
principal policy-making tool is the development of the bi-
ennial budget. Without dollars there can be no change in the 
aid formula and no class-size alternatives. The governor, 
through the Department of Finance, compiles the budget ev-
ery two years. With annual sessions there is now a supplemen-
tary budget in even-numbered years, but the major budget is 
prepared for the legislative session beginning in January of 
each odd-numbered year. 
The governor typically establishes firm budgetary guide-
lines for each department, including the Department of Edu-
cation. In recent years there has been a tendency to instruct 
each department to hold the line. If a new program is sought, 
an old one must be dropped or curtailed. The department is 
thereby placed in a difficult role. Educators look to the com-
missioner of education, the State Board, and Department of 
Education staff to serve as advocates of public education. The 
commissioner, board, and department accept this role and 
work hard to increase education funding within the executive 
budget process. However, once the budget process is com-
pleted, Department of Education personnel are bound, as 
part of the executive team, to support the governor's budget. 
Consequently, strained relations can develop within the 
education community during the legislative session; educa-
tion interest groups complain that there is not enough money 
for education while the department, commissioner, and 
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board must defend the budget, claiming that adequate funds 
are provided. During the heat of the battle, strained relations 
can form within the education community. 
Whenever the governor chooses to actively pursue an edu-
cational policy change, as noted earlier, rationale and back-
ground information can be assembled in several ways. In 
1971 Governor Anderson relied heavily on one of his own 
staff. John Haynes, a particularly skillful aide, worked with 
both the State Planning Agency and Department of Education 
staff in preparing background data. The authors of the gover-
nor's state aid bill looked to Haynes for their needed staff sup-
port. As noted by Dr. Tim Mazzoni, the commissioner of 
education "was not a participant in the main policy deci-
sions"( 4). 
When Governor Quie championed the K-3 class-size issue 
in 1979, he relied less on his own staff and more on the State 
Planning Agency, Department of Education personnel, and 
several education interest groups. There was no figure com-
parable to Haynes on the Quie staff in 1979. Key personalities 
in the current Perpich administration initiatives include sev-
eral members of the State Planning Agency and Department 
of Finance staff, including]ohn Haynes and the commissioner 
of education. 
Mentioned last in our discussion are the most powerful of 
the educational policy-makers: those legislators who serve on 
the Senate and House Education Aids committees. These men 
and women are responsible for developing the approxi-
mately 200-page bill known as the Omnibus Education Aids 
Act. The Aids Bill has provided a shortcut for amending educa-
tional policy, as many non-monetary items find their way into 
this encyclopedic bill. Each year the Omnibus Bill is put to-
gether by Senate and House Education Aids committees com-
posed of about ten legislators. The chairpersons are two of 
the most powerful legislators in the state. Under their guid-
ance the committees devise the formula whereby billions of 
state dollars are funneled into the public school districts. Al-
though Senate and House caucus leaders outline the general 
dollar boundaries within which the committees must oper-
ate, a certain latitude is given, leaving the means of distribu-
tion clearly within the province of the committee. 
Because the funding formula has become increasingly 
complex, few legislators are familiar with its intricacies. This 
places awesome responsibility in the hands of those legisla-
tors and legislative staff who are assigned to the Education 
Aids committees. 
Senate and House legislators independently develop their 
versions of the Omnibus Bill. These bills may differ in many 
ways. A legislative conference committee of five senators and 
five representatives is chosen to reconcile the differences be-
tween the two bills. Major educational policy decisions are 
made as consensus is reached. The conference committee 
must reconcile differences between the two versions quickly 
since the committee is seldom formed prior to the last weeks 
of the legislative session. A number of decisions are made in 
informal meetings between house and senate committee 
chairs and two or three of their staff. These decisions are al-
most always ratified by the full conference committee. The 
conference committee's report may not be amended on the 
House or Senate floor; it must be accepted or rejected in total. 
In practice, then, the deliberations of this group are crucial; 
this handful of legislators, along with committee and research 
staff, plays a central role in the development of public educa-
tion policy. 
During the 1970s, the number and importance of legisla-
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tive staff escalated dramatically. Legislative staff work year-
round and with experience become highly skilled in their 
area of assignment. Because their tenure may well overlap 
that of the committee chairs with whom they work, they play 
an important role in policy formation. While staff do not make 
policy, they are often instructed to develop policy alterna-
tives, and in the process of doing that they may become at least 
partners in the process, depending on the legislators with 
whom they work 
As was mentioned earlier, the Department of Education is 
responsible for providing information to legislators. By its 
very nature, this duty bestows a certain power on the informa-
tion providers. Prior to the addition oflegislative staff, depart-
ment personnel had a near monopoly on the supplying of 
educational data. In seeking reliable and timely information, 
legislative leaders have encouraged the development of a re-
liable information base. For example, a uniform accounting 
and reporting system has been legislatively mandated for all 
school districts. This system, implemented via a statewide 
computer network, makes available to legislators an almost 
instantaneous financial profile of each school district. Com-
puter terminals installed in Senate and House staff offices ac-
cess a variety of education data bases on finance, state aids, 
property taxes, and school staff, and provide the analytic tools 
to use the data for policy formulation. 
The authors conclude that, in the case of education fund-
ing, power resides principally in the hands of the governor, 
who sets the discussion with his budget recommendations 
and with a small group of legislators and legislative staff who 
reconcile the differences between House and Senate bills in 
all-important conference committee deliberations. 
Recent Policy Directions 
During the 1970s, policy changes were made to the 1971 
Minnesota Miracle as legislators attempted to address emerg-
ing problems. This section will discuss those changes and 
some of the factors that brought them about. The first change 
permitted districts with below-average revenues and expen-
ditures to access more revenue than other districts until they 
had reached the revenue level guaranteed by the basic for-
mula. Next, as more and more districts experienced rapidly 
declining enrollment, the formula was adjusted to cushion 
the revenue loss generated by the enrollment-driven for-
mula. The declining enrollment provisions granted signifi-
cant increases in the amount of state funding provided to 
districts. 
In spite of this, districts continued to reduce programs be-
cause of revenue shortages caused by a combination of en-
rollment decline, inflation, teacher salary increases, and 
reduction of staff by seniority. To solve this fiscal problem, 
districts increasingly asked voters to approve property tax in-
creases through the unequalized referendum levy, a property 
tax that has no associated state aid to assure an equal amount 
of revenue for the same tax effort in different districts. 
The major policy issue of the latter portion of the decade 
thus became the question of access to revenue from the prop-
erty tax base. With an unequalized property tax levy, districts 
with high property values are able to access significantly more 
revenue for a given rate of tax effort than are districts with low 
valued property. Historically, property rich districts had been 
able to access more revenue and, therefore, were able to 
provide better programs for their students. The majority of 
these districts were the metropolitan area districts repre-
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sented by the AMSD. During the 70s these districts were also 
experiencing the greatest financial difficulties due to declin-
ing enrollment and the tax levy limits of the new formula. This 
combination of factors produced increasing pressure on the 
governor and legislature to allow districts more freedom to 
raise local taxes without voter approval in order to maintain 
programs. Governor Quie supported this concept and urged 
that local school boards be given the ability to levy one or two 
mills above the formula-allotted amount without a voter ref-
erendum. 
Legislative leaders of both parties resisted the urgings of 
the governor and the AMSD, reasoning that allowing an on-
equalized mill levy would permit rich districts access to sub-
stantial funds while property poor districts with the same 
effort would raise minimal amounts. The 1971 formula had 
been adopted to counteract precisely this problem. The legis-
lature, in 1979, did agree to a limited local levy authority on an 
equalized basis. Districts were guaranteed that if they levied a 
mill locally, they would receive the same amount per pupil as 
was raised by one mill on the basic formula. As with other 
equalized formulas, the difference was covered by state aids. 
A property rich district would raise most of these funds 
through the property tax levy while the poor districts would 
levy the same mill rate but would get most of their funds from 
the state. While high spending districts have applauded the 
addition of the discretionary levy concept to the formula , 
many still support total access to local wealth, contending that 
if you have it, you should be able to spend it. If local residents 
resist increased property taxes, advocates insist, they can vote 
out the offending school board. 
Many influential legislators oppose this concept because 
they feel that already unequal educational opportunities 
would be accented. They contend that if students live in a 
property rich district, and if that district is willing to spend, 
programs would be expanded. Some students would there-
fore have drama, debate, advanced academic courses, foreign 
languages, etc., while others would not. Because the Minne-
sota constitution guarantees a general and uniform system of 
education, these legislators believe they have a duty to equal-
ize course offerings. In response, wealthy districts argue that 
equalizing has meant bringing superior education programs 
down to average. This debate is certain to continue with new 
solutions such as different types of formulas and interdistrict 
cooperation being suggested as solutions to the problem of 
program equity. 
The 1971 formula has not been as successful as some of its 
earliest advocates hoped it would be in increasing program 
variety in property poor districts, which have received in-
creased state funds. While studies in other states with similar 
formulas have noted staff and program additions in poorer 
districts, in Minnesota this trend has not been as pronounced. 
This may be partly accounted for by the fact that Minnesota has 
had an enollment decline greater than the nation as a whole 
(5). 
In Minnesota many outstate schools are still program poor. 
Statewide differences in curriculum offerings for students in 
grades 7-12 are so dramatic one has to wonder at the justice of 
the situation. At the same time, faculty salaries, while quite 
similar at beginning levels, show enormous differences at the 
middle and top ranges of the salary schedule ( 6). Rural legis-
lators are expresing a growing concern at this clearly visible, 
and difficult to justify, differential. 
At the same time that concerns about curriculum started to 
grow in the late 1970s, the formula changes made during that 
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decade began to have an impact on the state budget. Because 
many of the formula additions, such as declining enrollment 
aid, were funded totally from state revenue, the state commit-
ment to education funding grew rapidly. Certain formula pro-
visions, however , continued to be funded through 
unequalized levies. The revisions made by the 1979 legisla-
ture produced a formula in which most provisions were a 
combination of equalized levy and state aid. The mechanisms 
used to accomplish this produced two problems that would 
require attention in the future: basing the formula on histori-
cal costs and enrollment changes, and an increased reliance 
on the property tax for support of education. 
The early 1980s were a period of fiscal constraint and crisis 
caused by economic recession as well as tax policy changes. 
These years were dominated by cuts in state spending in all 
areas including education and produced little in the way of 
major policy changes. Nevertheless, in 1982 Governor Quie 
had the Department of Education develop a new approach to 
the formula for education funding in Minnesota. Although the 
Quie formula was not adopted, it did provide some ground-
work for the formula adopted by the 1983 legislature and 
Governor Perpich. 
It is hoped that this new formula will provide for more bal-
ance in program offerings between districts by equalizing ac-
cess to revenue among the districts . The new formula 
eliminates historical spending patterns that were locked into 
the previous formula and provides for cost differentials for 
districts that have high costs due to a highly trained and expe-
rienced teaching staff and for districts with a low enrollment 
scattered over many square miles. The formula provides a ba-
sic level of funding for all districts, adjusts this amount for the 
cost differentials , and then provides additional equalized 
levies at the option of the local districts. As the district elects to 
access more revenue, the amount of state equalization de-
clines. Except for cost-based differentials, all districts have ac-
cess to the same revenue at the same equalization rate. It is 
hoped that this access to revenue will be used by districts to 
equalize programs and salaries throughout the state. The for-
mula provisions are to be phased in over a four-year period 
beginning with the 1984-85 school year, so it will be some 
time before an analysis of the impact of the formula will be 
available. 
While the Minnesota legislature was settling into the hope 
of equal access that the decennial formula change would 
bring, another crisis was developing that would divert legisla-
tive attention from funding to issues related to curriculum, 
student learning, and quality. The national report, "A Nation 
At Risk," as well as many other similar reports, turned policy 
attention to a new set of issues. While other states infused mas-
sive amounts of money into their educational systems, Minne-
sota moved more slowly to develop and pilot low-cost 
initiatives for excellence. These initiatives were outgrowths 
of local district, Department of Education, commissioner of 
education, gubernatorial, and legislative ideas. The initiatives 
include new legislative interest in the quality of teaching and 
learning in Minnesota, as well as a continuing concern about 
how to equalize student access to the state's educational pro-
grams. The initial policy decisions include new state funding 
for staff and curriculum development, technology utilization, 
and instructional effectiveness programs. 
Another area of widespread interest involves providing ad-
ditional choice to students within the public school system. 
Governor Perpich has traveled throughout the state urging 
the legislature to enact an open enrollment policy allowing 
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students to attend the public school of their choice in order to 
gain access to the academic programs they desire. The gover-
nor has also advocated a Minnesota state high school for the 
arts and another that would concentrate on science and math-
ematics. The Minnesota Business Partnership, new to the edu-
cational policy scene, funded a major study of education in 
Minnesota and produced a report calling for increased qual-
ity, increased choice for students, and a major restructuring of 
teaching and learning in the state. 
With a major new formula for education funding ; with 
growing concerns about quality, program access, and exc~l­
lence· and with new players in the policy arena, the remam-
der of the decade should provide immense opportunity and 
challenge to the principal educational policy-makers in Min-
nesota: those legislators sitting on the key Senate and House 
education committees. 
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